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Abstract The rise of delinquencies and foreclosures in a softening housing
market calls for systematic studies of default behavior and efforts
to minimize the default risks. Using a sample of residential
mortgages made to low- to moderate-income borrowers, this
paper empirically examines the impact of a proactive post-
purchase counseling service on moderately delinquent
mortgages. It demonstrates that well-timed, situation-appropriate
counseling, even over the phone, effectively increases the curing
probability of delinquent borrowers. The ﬁndings hold even after
accounting for unobserved heterogeneity among borrowers and
the endogeneity problem. Many other factors, such as home
equity, local economic conditions, and borrower and loan
characteristics, also impact the transition of delinquencies.
With the elevated levels of delinquency and foreclosure in recent years,1
foreclosure prevention efforts, particularly post-purchase counseling programs,
have drawn the attention of researchers, practitioners, and policy makers (see
review in Quercia, Gorham, and Rohe, 2006). This issue is particularly important
in the low- to moderate-income (LMI) market since low-income borrowers are
usually associated with a higher risk of mortgage default (Van Order, Firestone,
and Zorn, 2007). Because LMI borrowers typically have less ﬁnancial reserves,
smaller equity cushions, and higher debt-to-income ratios, default and foreclosure
become real possibilities for them when unexpected ﬁnancial shocks create either
short- or long-term insolvency problems. Furthermore, once these borrowers fall
behind, they usually do not have enough reserves to recover quickly. So a better
understanding of default risks and efforts to minimize the foreclosure rates for
borrowers already in delinquency is crucial to helping them keep their homes in
the current softening market, where delinquency and foreclosure rates are
historically high.
A number of studies have investigated loan termination outcomes and losses for
conventional, FHA, and subprime loans (e.g., Crawford and Rosenblatt, 1995;316  Ding, Quercia, and Ratcliffe
Ambrose and Capone, 1998; Capone and Metz, 2003; Philips and VanderHoff,
2004; Cutts and Green, 2005; Capozza and Thomson, 2006; and Pennington-
Cross, 2006a, 2006b). However, most studies are limited in the variety of options
that delinquent borrowers hold and the factors that may impact loan terminations.
In particular, most foreclosure studies have focused on the borrower’s option to
default, with little attention to foreclosure prevention or loss mitigation efforts by
servicers. In fact, the mortgage servicing industry has experienced dramatic
changes and has made many innovations in programs and policies that help
homeowners retain their homes (Cutts and Green, 2005). The proliferation of
credit scoring tools also enables servicers to identify risky borrowers and employ
strategies to prevent early delinquent borrowers from falling further behind. For
seriously delinquent borrowers, servicers or third-party agencies may offer
intensive counseling services, helping borrowers evaluate their ﬁnancial conditions
and offering home retention workout plans or other alternatives to foreclosure.
Many mechanisms and programs are in place to manage and minimize default
and foreclosure risk, and some strategies may be more cost-effective than others.
Post-purchase homeownership counseling and education have been considered as
important mechanisms in foreclosure prevention efforts; however, there has been
little convincing empirical evidence to support this view. There has been some
evidence that pre-purchase counseling can offset the default risk, as lenders
relaxed underwriting standards in their affordable housing lending (Hornburg,
2004). Although lenders, community-based organizations, and government
agencies established an increasing number of post-purchase counseling programs
due to a rising tide of foreclosure (Reid, 2006), post-purchase counseling programs
are still fewer in number and less extensive than pre-purchase programs.
Furthermore, evaluating the effectiveness of post-purchase counseling or
foreclosure-prevention programs has been difﬁcult because of data scarcity, lack
of a standard deﬁnition of success, and the ethical and practical complications of
ﬁnding control groups (Quercia, Cowan, and Moreno, 2008).
Stegman, Quercia, Ratcliffe, Ding, and Davis (2007) test several preventive
servicing-related propositions in the transition from early delinquency (30-day) to
default (90-day), using a group of mortgage loans serving LMI borrowers. They
ﬁnd that the key indicators of default risk at the time of underwriting [e.g., credit
score and loan-to-value (LTV) ratio] are generally insigniﬁcant in predicting
whether an already delinquent loan will default. Most importantly, they ﬁnd that
the likelihood that a delinquent mortgagor will ultimately default varies
signiﬁcantly across loan servicers, even after controlling for loan and borrower
characteristics. However, their study does not investigate the speciﬁc role of loan
servicers in the transition from default to foreclosure.
To ﬁll the gap in the early literature and to extend the work of Stegman, Quercia,
Ratcliffe, Ding, and Davis (2007), this study empirically examines the impact
of a proactive delinquency counseling practice on the outcomes of moderate
delinquencies. This analysis contributes to the existing literature in several ways.
First, the study focuses on a group of home purchase loans that serve LMIPost-purchase Counseling  317
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borrowers. It is still unclear whether the delinquent loans serving the LMI
population behave differently over time than ordinary prime loans, FHA loans, or
subprime loans. Second, the study uses a rich dataset that includes borrower and
loan information at origination and a complete monthly payment history for each
individual loan. Finally, since there are data on certain servicer-initiated practices,
such as post-purchase counseling for delinquent borrowers and loan modiﬁcations,
these practices are considered in the analysis. This is also an important
contribution, as the servicing side of the affordable housing system becomes more
critical than ever with the proliferation of affordable lending products.
The ﬁndings reveal that most moderate delinquencies do not end in foreclosure.
A delinquent borrower can either remain delinquent for some time or eventually
exit delinquency through curing, prepayment, loan modiﬁcation, or foreclosure.
The results demonstrate that timely delinquency counseling is effective in
increasing the curing probability of LMI delinquent borrowers. This ﬁnding holds
even after accounting for unobserved heterogeneity among borrowers and the
endogeneity problem related to counseling. The success of counseling appears to
depend on timing, and only counseling that addresses an active delinquency
situation is effective. These ﬁndings suggest that well-timed, situation-appropriate
counseling, even over the phone, effectively and efﬁciently increases the
probability of curing delinquencies. Many other factors, such as home equity, local
economic conditions, and borrower and loan characteristics, also impact the
transition of delinquencies.
The next section reviews recent literature on the delinquency transition and
counseling. The third section describes data and methodology. Empirical results
are in the fourth section, followed by conclusions.
 Literature Review
Early literature on loan performance generally considers foreclosure a one-step
decision for borrowers and limits borrowers’ options to either losing the home
(foreclosure), paying off the mortgage (prepayment), or remaining active (Quercia
and Stegman, 1992). However, recent studies have started to recognize that
mortgage default and foreclosure are two separate events, and that foreclosure is
only one possible outcome of a delinquency episode (e.g., Ambrose and Capone,
1998). In this framework, a borrower ﬁrst decides technically to default on the
mortgage by not making a scheduled mortgage payment or by not paying in full.
This may result from a decision to exercise the put option or from a temporary
ﬁnancial crisis that causes the borrower to delay mortgage payments to ﬁnance
other expenditures. Delinquent borrowers in fact have a set of alternative options,
such as paying off the mortgage by reﬁnancing or selling the property, or some
other solution that allows the borrower to retain the home and reinstate the
mortgage over time. When a borrower is no longer able to afford the mortgage
and a regular sale would be too costly, voluntary title transfer serves as another
option.318  Ding, Quercia, and Ratcliffe
Several recent studies identify speciﬁc factors that affect whether defaulted loans
will go through to foreclosure. Studies that use data on conventional or FHA
mortgages identify that home equity level, borrower characteristics, local
economic and housing market conditions, and state foreclosure laws affect default
resolution probabilities (Ambrose and Capone, 1998; Capone and Metz, 2003; and
Philips and VanderHoff, 2004). In the subprime market, Capozza and Thomson
(2006) and Pennington-Cross (2006b) ﬁnd some evidence that delinquent
subprime loans are more likely to become real estate owned (REO) than other
loan products but usually take much longer to get there. They ﬁnd that lenders
are more likely to be tolerant when the delinquent borrower has made some
payments, when the payment-to-income ratio is high, when general economic
conditions are favorable, or when the interest rate premium is high.
Some recent efforts have examined the impact of a variety of mechanisms on
foreclosure prevention and loss mitigation. For example, Cutts and Green (2005)
provide an excellent review of the servicing literature and innovations in loan
servicing and loss mitigation technology. They use Cox’s hazard model to
investigate the impact of repayment plans on foreclosure incidence and loss
mitigation, based on a large sample of Freddie Mac loans in different levels of
delinquency. They ﬁnd that borrowers who enter repayment plans have a much
lower probability of home loss (80% lower for borrowers overall and 68% lower
for LMI borrowers). For FHA loans, Capone and Metz (2003) ﬁnd that the
introduction of loss mitigation programs successfully lowered the foreclosure rate.
Research concerning homeownership education and counseling is less prevalent,
although providing homeownership education and counseling services to
delinquent borrowers has been considered an important tool in mitigating default
and foreclosure risks. The roots of the post-purchase services industry go back to
the 1960s, when the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968 allowed
the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to authorize
counselors to provide counseling to homeowners in the Section 235 low-income
homeownership program (Quercia, Gorham, and Rohe, 2006). Counseling
agencies focused mainly on foreclosure prevention for almost two decades,
primarily because of high foreclosure rates among HUD’s homeownership
programs.
In the 1990s, however, when efforts were made to expand homeownership among
LMI households, industry players shifted resources and attention toward pre-
purchase counseling to offset default risk. The majority of the previous empirical
studies have focused on the impact of pre-purchase homeownership counseling
on loan performance; empirical studies on post-purchase counseling are scarce. In
his review article, Hornburg (2004) indicates that there are some credible and
substantiated research ﬁndings about the impact of pre-purchase homeownership
counseling on loan performance. For example, Hirad and Zorn (2002) provide the
ﬁrst empirical analysis of the impact of pre-purchase counseling on delinquency
and conclude that pre-purchase counseling can effectively reduce default risk (90-
day). Additionally, Hartarska and Gonzalez-Vega (2005) provide evidence that
credit counseling reduces the incidence of default.Post-purchase Counseling  319
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Only a few recent studies empirically examine foreclosure prevention counseling
programs provided by community-based agencies. Quercia, Cowan, and Moreno
(2008) ﬁnd that community-based foreclosure prevention services provided by the
Mortgage Foreclosure Prevention Program are cost-effective in terms of two
measures: time-to-resolution and recidivism. They ﬁnd that delinquent borrowers
who received both pre-purchase counseling and post-purchase foreclosure services
are more likely to keep their homes and resolve their delinquency quicker, and
are less likely to experience delinquency within three years after the delinquency
intervention. Collins (2007) focuses on borrowers’ perceptions and assessments of
counseling based on survey data. The results suggest that borrowers who receive
more hours of counseling perceive counseling more favorably than those who
receive less counseling. Borrowers who receive more intensive counseling are also
less likely to lose their homes in foreclosure. Generally, existing empirical studies
on post-purchase counseling suggest a positive impact of post-purchase
counseling, but the results are far from conclusive since the studies suffer from
data problems, the lack of standard measures of the beneﬁts of counseling, and
the difﬁculties in ﬁnding control groups.
This study combines and extends these two related strains of research: one
concerning the delinquency transition and the second concerning the impact of
homeownership education and counseling. With an awareness that counseling
programs vary by their method of delivery, desired outcomes, counselor
characteristics, and program content, this research contributes to the literature by
focusing on the impact of an early proactive counseling service. Servicers’ main
approach since the early 1990s has been to activate personal contact for assistance
at 90-days delinquency; usually servicers consider intervention prior to 90 days
too costly because of the high rate of borrower self cures. However, an early
proactive intervention may be crucial for some delinquent borrowers, who may
need advice to help them overcome short-term difﬁculties or ﬁnd alternatives to
foreclosure. Indeed, when a delinquency becomes very serious and a legal notice
of foreclosure has been issued, it is sometimes impossible for a servicer to
intervene successfully. For this reason, Freddie Mac recently announced that it
will instruct its servicers to become more involved after 60-days delinquency
rather than waiting until 90-days delinquency.2 The current study empirically
analyzes the effects of one early proactive intervention on the transition of
moderately delinquent loans.
 Data and Methodology
The data for this study come primarily from a subset of home purchase loans
originated by a group of lenders under the Self-Help Ventures Fund’s Community
Advantage Program (CAP), also known as the Self-Help Secondary Market
Program. Many nonconforming loans are held in lenders’ portfolios because most
of them meet neither the underwriting guidelines used by secondary mortgage
market institutions in their standard of affordable loan purchases nor the320  Ding, Quercia, and Ratcliffe
underwriting guidelines for FHA loans. However, under the CAP program,
participating lenders are able to sell these nonconforming mortgages to Self-Help,
which then securitizes and sells them to Fannie Mae and other investors. CAP
loans are characterized by ﬂexible underwriting that usually requires little or no
downpayment, high debt burdens, nontraditional proofs of creditworthiness, and
sometimes no requirement for mortgage insurance. CAP borrowers are either low-
income borrowers or LMI minority borrowers, or LMI borrowers in low-income
or minority neighborhoods.3
This study uses a subset of 25,725 CAP loans originated from 1998 to 2004
(Exhibit 1). All CAP loans in this sample are ﬁxed-rate home purchase loans,
99% of which have a 30-year amortization period. The loans do not feature
prepayment penalties or balloons. The average note rate is 7.2% and the average
loan amount is about $90,000. Loans in this sample are characterized by a high
original LTV ratio: over 76% of the loans have an original LTV of 95% or higher,
and with over 67% at 97% LTV or higher. This sample of CAP borrowers is also
characterized by low credit scores and low household income; about 42% of
borrowers have an origination credit score of less than 660 or have no credit score
at all. The mean household income at origination was about $33,000, and the
mean backend ratio was 36%. About 47% are minority borrowers. National in
scope, this sample of CAP loans originated in 49 states, with 22% of the loans
originating in North Carolina.
Exhibit 2 shows the worst delinquencies for loans that originated between January
1998 and December 2004. During the study period (January 2003 to September
2006), most CAP loans (77%) in the sample did not experience delinquency. But
many CAP borrowers have experienced different levels of delinquencies. About
11% of the sample had at least one 60 day delinquency and almost 8% had at
least one 90 day delinquency. Generally, the performance numbers of the sample
during the study period reﬂect the performance of the whole pool of loans, though
some loans were terminated before 2003.
To prevent early delinquencies from falling further behind and to reduce the rate
of foreclosure among serious delinquencies, Self-Help suggests a speciﬁc
servicing timeline for its subservicers to follow through a delinquency process.
According to Self-Help, its primary goal in servicing is to help borrowers stay in
their homes. As a nonproﬁt organization, Self-Help’s philosophy differs from the
traditional industry strategy in both ﬂexibility and timing. Self-Help is more
comfortable allowing borrowers more time to recover from a hardship, and it
instructs servicers to do whatever they can to avoid foreclosure. Of course, as
indicated in Stegman, Quercia, Ratcliffe, Ding, and Davis (2007), servicers may
differ in their actual delinquency management processes.
The Proactive Counseling Program
Since late 2002, Self-Help has been working with Consumer Credit Counseling
Services (CCCS) of San Francisco to provide counseling to moderately delinquentPost-purchase Counseling  321
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Exhibit 1  Descriptive Statistics of Origination Information for CAP Loans
Variable Percent Mean
Credit Score
No Credit Score or missing 8.51%
FICO  620 13.42%
FICO 620–659 20.40%
FICO 660–719 30.12%




























Notes: The number of loans is 25,725. The loans originated between January 1, 1998, and
December 31, 2004. The sources are Self-Help Community Advantage and authors’ calculations.
This sample only includes the loans that were still active as of January 1, 2003, or later. Sample
size may differ for different variables because of missing data.322  Ding, Quercia, and Ratcliffe





# of Loans Percent # of Loans Percent
Never Delinquent 22,158 75.7% 19,846 77.2%
30 Days 7,123 24.3% 5,879 22.9%
60 Days 3,498 11.9% 2,835 11.0%
90 Days Delinquent 2,535 8.7% 2,027 7.9%
120 Days Delinquent 2,044 7.0% 1,599 6.2%
Total 29,281a 25,725
Note: Loans originated between January 1, 1998 and December 31, 2004 only; from Self-Help
and authors’ calculations.
aThis sample size is larger because it includes loans that were terminated though prepayment or
foreclosure between January 1, 1998 and January 1, 2003.
homeowners. Borrowers from selected servicers (six servicers as of July 2006)
who were 45-days delinquent were referred for delinquency counseling offered
by CCCS. Referred delinquent homeowners receive an introductory letter from
the servicer notifying them that they will receive a telephone call from CCCS to
discuss their situation. To avoid any negative connotations associated with budget
or credit counseling, the program is referred to as a ‘‘housing education program’’
in partnership with the borrower’s servicer. CCCS is allowed to make up to three
attempts to contact the borrower within 30 days after the referral. Homeowners
are given ﬁnancial and budget counseling over the telephone if they can be
reached. We know the exact date and result of each contact. Homeowners with
loans managed by other servicers did not have the opportunity to receive this
counseling service. Overall, the participating servicers were handling 22% of all
loans in this sample but served 43% of all 60-day delinquencies. This is not
surprising, because Self-Help deliberately sought to provide delinquency
counseling to portfolios with poorer performance.
The result of a contact may be:
1. Borrower not reached (none);
2. Contact, with brief introduction of counseling services (contact);
3. Longer conversation to help the borrower assess ﬁnancial information,
and tips on budgeting and debt management to avoid delinquency
(counsel); or
4. In-depth assessment, usually for an hour, of the borrower’s ﬁnancial
condition and options, and creation of a plan of action to get the borrower
current (counsel).Post-purchase Counseling  323
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The different levels of treatment were coded, with treatment 1 being ‘‘none’’
because the servicer could not contact the borrower and the borrower received
no counseling service. Treatment 2 is ‘‘contact,’’ as there was only a brief
conversation and no counseling. Treatments 3 and 4 are very similar and are
considered as ‘‘counsel.’’ A telephone counseling session usually takes about an
hour.
Self-Help records reveal that 1,435 loans were referred through July 1, 2006.
About 22% of the referred loans were ‘‘contact’’ only and 33% received
counseling service. Some borrowers were contacted by the counseling agency
several times, usually because they experienced multiple 45-day delinquencies.
Because of serial referrals and different servicer practices, many borrowers were
contacted at some point other than 45-day delinquency.4 In fact, 21% of the
referred loans never reached 60-day delinquency.
 Sample Selection and Modeling
This analysis focuses on what happens to moderately delinquent loans (60-day).
Loan payment history data was used to identify when a loan was 60-days
delinquent and how long it stayed delinquent, which generated a ‘‘delinquency
spell.’’ The delinquency spell started from the ﬁrst month that the loan was
identiﬁed as delinquent (60-day) during the study period and ended either the day
the delinquency was resolved (terminated or cured) or at the end of the study
period, whichever came ﬁrst. Once a delinquent loan was cured, any subsequent
60-day delinquency generated a new spell.
The study period from January 2003 to September 2006 was selected primarily
for practical reasons. Self-Help did not develop its own servicing philosophy and
strategies until late 2002.5 For example, Self-Help did not approve any loan
modiﬁcations before 2002 and did not initiate its proactive counseling program
until late 2002. Those delinquencies that occurred before 2003 were excluded,
generally because there was no opportunity for the delinquent borrowers to receive
the counseling service. Loans that experienced their ﬁrst 60-day delinquencies
after 2005 were also excluded since they were too recent for observation of their
ﬁnal outcomes. After further excluding the loans that were returned to the original
lenders because of the ‘‘limited indemnity’’ rule6 and a few loans with missing
data, the study sample consists of 2,975 60-day delinquency spells of 1,689 loans.
About 57% of 60-day delinquent borrowers experienced only one 60-day
delinquency during the study period, 24% experienced 60-day delinquencies twice,
and the remaining 19% experienced three or more 60-day delinquencies.
Among the 2,975 60-day delinquent spells, 924 (31%) were referred for
counseling, among whom 238 (26%) were contacted only, 350 (38%) received
counseling services, and the rest (336, or 36%) could not be reached as of July
2006. Borrowers may receive counseling services before or after they are 60-days
delinquent; 233 homeowners received counseling before the current 60-day
delinquency and 183 during delinquency (Exhibit 3).324  Ding, Quercia, and Ratcliffe





Total None Contact Counsel None Contact Counsel
Cured 65.5 65.5 65.4 65.2 64.9 67.9 72.1
Distressed PIF 7.3 8.1 2.2 2.2 7.7 3 4.4
Loan modiﬁcation 3.2 3.3 1.7 2.6 3.4 2.4 0.6
Foreclosure 14.5 15.3 12.3 7.3 14.6 14.9 12
Delinquent 9.7 7.8 18.4 22.8 9.4 11.9 10.9
Total spells (#) 2,975 2,563 179 233 2,624 168 183
Note: From Self-Help and author’s calculation; based on a group of 2,975 60-day delinquent
spells of 1,689 CAP loans from January 1, 2003 to September 1, 2006.
Each delinquency spell could be resolved in one of the following ways:
 Cured: The outcome of a spell is coded as ‘‘cured’’ if the delinquency
status becomes current according to the payment records. Loans that were
prepaid when they were current or in 30-day delinquency are also
considered ‘‘cured.’’7
 Delinquent: An active loan is considered ‘‘delinquent’’ if it was both
active and delinquent (30 day) at the end of the study period.8
 Prepaid (or ‘‘distressed prepayment’’): If a loan was prepaid when it was
60 days delinquent, it is considered a ‘‘distressed prepayment.’’9
 Modiﬁed: If the terms of a mortgage loan were permanently changed
and were approved by Self-Help, the outcome of the loan is recorded as
‘‘modiﬁed.’’ A loan modiﬁcation is treated in this study as a loan
termination, even though a loan’s performance can be tracked after the
modiﬁcation.
 Foreclosure: This category includes both loans for which the lender took
title through foreclosure and pre-foreclosure sales, as they also result in
the borrowers losing their homes through title transfer.10
A multinomial logit (MNL) is used to model outcomes with multiple possible
states. In each month the loan can be in only one state or outcome (cured,
delinquent, prepaid, modiﬁed, or foreclosed). Since the sum of the probabilities
of each outcome must equal one, the increase in the probability of one outcome
necessitates a decrease in the probability of at least one competing outcome. Thus
the multinomial logit model is a competing risk model. The probability of
observing a particular loan outcome is given by:Post-purchase Counseling  325
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where j  0, 1, 2, 3, 4 represents the ﬁve possible outcomes of a delinquency
spell and the omitted category (j  0) is foreclosure. dijt is an indicator variable
taking the value 1 if outcome j occurs to loan i at time t and zero otherwise. Z
contains a set of explanatory variables,  is the coefﬁcient, and C contains the
counseling variables. To control for the potential statistical problems associated
with repeated events, the model was estimated using Stata’s mlogit procedure with
an adjustment to the standard errors for clustering by loan.
There are at least four issues affecting the determination of the study sample and
the speciﬁcations of the model. The ﬁrst is a sample selection issue. Data used
for the analysis are conditional on the loans surviving up until the start of the
study period, January 1, 2003 (for loans originated before 2003). As a result,
delinquent loans that ended in foreclosure or were prepaid before 2003 are not
included because the focus is on the time period of the study window. The strategy,
therefore, for different study samples is ﬁrst to check the descriptive statistics of
the independent variables, which do not suggest very signiﬁcant differences across
the samples (Exhibit 4). A separate model is run for all the 60-day delinquencies
(from origination to the end of study period) to determine whether there is any
serious bias when focusing only on the delinquencies in the study period.
However, the analysis suggests that the qualitative results are generally unchanged
by using the smaller sample (Model 1 vs. Model 2 in Exhibit 6), so the results
based on the study sample are reliable.
The second concern is the bias caused by the lender indemnity rules. Lenders are
required to retain main recourse on the loan until 12 consecutive on-time payments
are made. In other words, loans must survive with good payment history for a
consecutive 12-month period. Otherwise, they are subject to being sent back to
the original lenders. About 10% of the 60-day delinquent loans were lost because
of this rule. This feature of the data may create additional selection bias; however,
it may help the study to focus on the more normal delinquency and default cycle
since it mainly excluded some early payment defaults, which are often thought to
be associated with fraud. The selection of the study sample can also be interpreted






























Exhibit 4  Descriptive Statistics
Full Sample Study Sample Participating Servicers
Variable Mean Std. rr. Mean Std. rr. Mean Std. rr. Description
call 0.149 0.082 0.164 0.071 0.172 0.056 Call option: Saving from reﬁnancing in the prime market
put 0.284 0.204 0.310 0.213 0.306 0.167 Put option: (unpaid balance-house price)/original price
lupb 11.075 0.406 11.065 0.397 11.033 0.348 Unpaid balance (in log)
af american 0.418 0.493 0.429 0.495 0.592 0.491 African-American borrower
delinq 0.383 0.219 0.373 0.214 0.369 0.213 Share of observed months loan was delinquent prior to the
60-day delinquency
loanage 3.073 1.510 3.365 1.484 3.860 1.444 Loan age in years when delinquency starts
dur 9.062 9.634 10.177 10.331 10.833 10.431 Months after entering 60-day delinquency
unemp rate 5.685 0.994 5.677 0.968 5.796 1.008 State unemployment rate
hpi a 5.651 4.714 5.862 5.141 4.660 3.041 MSAa house price appreciation rate: appreciate rate relative
to the same quarter in the previous year
nc 0.415 0.493 0.414 0.492 0.645 0.479 Property in North Carolina
counsel spell 0.068 0.251 0.125 0.331 Counseling service during delinquency spell
contact spell 0.059 0.236 0.110 0.313 Contacted only by servicer during delinquency spell
counsel bef 0.076 0.265 0.141 0.348 Ever received counseling before the current delinquency spell
contact bef 0.058 0.233 0.107 0.309 Ever contacted by servicer before the current delinquency
spell
Notes: For the full sample, N  30,043 of 2,089 loans; for the study sample, N  22,925 of 1,689 loans; for the participating servicers, N  12,385 of
781 loans. The sources are Self-Help and authors’ calculations.
aIf the property is located outside an MSA, the state house price index is used.Post-purchase Counseling  327
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Thirdly, there is the issue of unobserved heterogeneity among delinquent
borrowers. It is impossible to obtain loan-speciﬁc parameters to measure the
impact of unobserved or random forces impacting the outcome. Instead of
assuming that the heterogeneity follows some distribution, this analysis follows a
simpliﬁed approach employed in Pennington-Cross (2006b). As Equation (2)
shows, a total of M groups can be identiﬁed that have higher or lower likelihoods
of terminating the loan through different methods. Instead of observing to
which group each loan belongs, this technique estimates a discrete probability
distribution so that each heterogeneous group has a unique inﬂuence on the
conditional probability estimate. pm is the mass-point parameter representing the
proportion of loans in the mth group.11 The location parameters, vjm, reﬂect the
idiosyncratic risk for risk j for the mth unobserved heterogeneous group. Each
group of loans is identiﬁed by a mass point, representing a distinct mass of loans.
This analysis uses this technique to obtain estimates of the size of each mass point
and the idiosyncratic shift in the probability estimates using maximum likelihood
method. Model 5 in Exhibit 5 shows the results from the model allowing for two
unobserved heterogeneous groups.
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Pr(y  j)  for j  1,2,3,4 4 it
 Z  C v ki t ki t j m 1  e 
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The fourth potential problem is the borrower assignment/selection issue as it
relates to counseling. The sample selection and endogeneity issues need to be
addressed to determine whether the estimated impacts capture only the effect of
counseling itself. First, the MNL model treats all the delinquencies that were not
counseled (or contacted) as the control group. However, many delinquent
borrowers were not referred for counseling because their servicers did not
participate in the program. For those referred, the more ‘‘motivated’’ lower-risk
delinquent borrowers may disproportionately choose to receive the counseling
service, which results in an overestimate of the beneﬁts of the counseling service.
However, it is also possible that lower-risk delinquent borrowers are less motivated
to receive counseling because they have more conﬁdence in self-curing. A series
of models focusing on delinquencies handled by the participating servicers were








































Risk Variable Coeff. RRR Coeff. RRR Coeff. RRR Coeff. RRR Coeff. RRR
Delinq call 0.014 0.986 0.047 1.048 0.047 1.049 0.043 1.044 0.198** 1.219
put 0.391*** 0.676 0.637*** 0.529 0.636*** 0.529 0.638*** 0.528 0.582*** 0.559
lupb 0.009 1.009 0.005 1.005 0.005 1.005 0.004 1.004 0.054 1.056
af american 0.730*** 2.075 0.761*** 2.141 0.754*** 2.126 0.756*** 2.130 1.054*** 2.869
delinq 0.458*** 1.582 0.503*** 1.654 0.501*** 1.650 0.502*** 1.652 0.503*** 1.653
loanage 0.206*** 0.814 0.246*** 0.782 0.248*** 0.780 0.254*** 0.776 0.160 0.852
dur 0.412*** 0.663 0.410*** 0.664 0.411** 0.663 0.411*** 0.663 0.058 0.944
unemp rate 0.027 1.027 0.055 1.056 0.055 1.056 0.059 1.061 0.158** 1.171
hpi a 0.030 0.971 0.119 0.888 0.116 0.890 0.122 0.885 0.124 0.883
nc 0.043 0.958 0.036 0.965 0.035 0.966 0.057 0.945 0.007 1.008
counsela 0.176 1.193 0.161 1.175 0.063 1.065
contacta 0.148 0.863 0.118 1.125 0.064 1.066
Cured call 0.109** 0.897 0.059 0.942 0.059 0.943 0.069 0.933 0.112* 0.894
put 0.483*** 0.617 0.749*** 0.473 0.745*** 0.475 0.755*** 0.470 0.954*** 0.385
lupb 0.055 0.946 0.051 0.950 0.051 0.951 0.053 0.949 0.066 0.937
af american 0.652*** 1.919 0.684*** 1.981 0.681*** 1.977 0.668*** 1.950 0.696*** 2.006
delinq 0.519*** 1.680 0.597*** 1.817 0.597*** 1.816 0.595*** 1.814 0.675*** 1.964
loanage 0.275*** 0.760 0.321*** 0.725 0.315*** 0.730 0.341*** 0.711 0.458*** 0.633
dur 1.071*** 0.343 1.112*** 0.329 1.113*** 0.329 1.128*** 0.324 1.519*** 0.219
unemp rate 0.018 0.982 0.017 0.983 0.017 0.983 0.008 0.992 0.007 0.993
hpi a 0.003 1.003 0.094 0.911 0.089 0.914 0.098 0.907 0.202* 0.817
nc 0.110 0.896 0.140 0.869 0.135 0.873 0.188 0.829 0.175 0.839
counsela 0.116 1.123 0.411* 1.509 0.655** 1.925
















































Exhibit 5  (continued)











Risk Variable Coeff. RRR Coeff. RRR Coeff. RRR Coeff. RRR Coeff. RRR
Prepaid call 0.046 0.955 0.040 0.960 0.037 0.964 0.042 0.959 0.120 1.128
put 0.721*** 0.486 0.932*** 0.394 0.903*** 0.405 0.932*** 0.394 0.875*** 0.417
lupb 0.204** 1.227 0.213* 1.238 0.213* 1.238 0.213* 1.237 0.261** 1.299
af american 0.167 0.846 0.223 0.800 0.176 0.839 0.224 0.799 0.086 1.090
delinq 0.372*** 1.451 0.491*** 1.634 0.501*** 1.650 0.488*** 1.629 0.483*** 1.620
loanage 0.443*** 0.642 0.426*** 0.653 0.362*** 0.696 0.428*** 0.652 0.326** 0.722
dur 0.864*** 0.421 0.859*** 0.423 0.848*** 0.428 0.856*** 0.425 0.456*** 0.634
unemp rate 0.168** 1.183 0.246*** 1.279 0.241*** 1.273 0.248*** 1.282 0.356*** 1.427
hpi a 0.120 1.128 0.063 1.065 0.073 1.076 0.059 1.061 0.059 1.061
nc 0.406** 0.666 0.401* 0.670 0.373* 0.689 0.403* 0.668 0.336 0.715
counsela 0.594 0.552 0.221 1.248 0.094 1.099
contacta 1.014* 0.363 0.307 0.735 0.377 0.686
Modiﬁed call 0.017 1.017 0.152 0.859 0.149 0.862 0.138 0.871 0.153 0.858
put 0.102* 1.107 0.399 1.490 0.416 1.517 0.417 1.518 0.396 1.486
lupb 0.412*** 1.510 0.391*** 1.478 0.392*** 1.479 0.390*** 1.477 0.379*** 1.461
af american 0.486** 1.625 0.464* 1.591 0.481* 1.618 0.487* 1.628 0.547** 1.727
delinq 0.440*** 1.553 0.500*** 1.649 0.510*** 1.665 0.509*** 1.664 0.552*** 1.737
loanage 0.333*** 1.396 0.252 1.287 0.296* 1.345* 0.284 1.328 0.268 1.308
dur 0.199*** 0.820 0.184* 0.832 0.187* 0.829* 0.165 0.848 0.260* 0.771
unemp rate 0.109 1.115 0.147 1.158 0.146 1.157 0.135 1.144 0.151 1.163
hpi a 0.368*** 1.445 0.502*** 1.652 0.511*** 1.667 0.507*** 1.661 0.523** 1.686





























Exhibit 5  (continued)











Risk Variable Coeff. RRR Coeff. RRR Coeff. RRR Coeff. RRR Coeff. RRR
counsela 0.024 0.977 1.702 0.182 1.724 0.178
contacta 0.851 0.427 0.297 0.743 0.306 0.736
mass 1.603***
constant delinq 3.935*** 3.847*** 3.847*** 3.840*** 13.178***
0.894***
cured 1.592*** 1.414*** 1.418*** 1.390*** 4.208***
1.337***
prepaid 0.438*** 0.529*** 0.477*** 0.527*** 8.875***
6.267***
modiﬁed 1.677*** 1.570*** 1.540*** 1.540*** 1.397***
1.545***
Note: All continuous variables are standardized for estimation. Please refer to Exhibit 4 for a detailed description of the variables. RRR is the relative risk
ratio and the reference group if foreclosure. Model 1: N  30,043 of 2,089 loans and log likelihood  13,341.6***; Model 2: N  22,925 of 1,689
loans and log likelihood  10,052.2***; Mode 3: N  22,925 of 1,689 loans and log likelihood  10,047.4***; Model 4: N  22,925 of 1,689
loans and log likelihood  10,043.4***; Model 5: N  22,925 of 1,689 loans and log likelihood  10,010.9***.
aThe counseling variables are counsel bef and contact bef for Model 3 and counsel spell and contact spell for Model 4 and Model 5.
*Signiﬁcant at the 0.1 level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level.
***Signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level.Post-purchase Counseling  331
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counseling. The results were compared with a two-stage selection model designed
to control for the endogeneity issue, following the idea of Hirad and Zorn (2002).
In the two-stage selection model, delinquent borrowers select or are assigned to
receive different levels of counseling: contact only or counseling. The ﬁrst stage
of the analysis uses a multinomial logit model to estimate the different levels of
counseling a delinquent borrower may select. The probability estimates are
incorporated into a simpliﬁed version of the multinomial logit model. Speciﬁcally,
the MNL model is estimated as:
ˆ ( Z P(X) ) ji j e
Pr(y  j)  for j  1,2,3,4, (3) 4 i
ˆ ( Z P(X) ) ki k 1  e 
k1
where X contains a set of predictors of whether borrowers are assigned to or select
different levels of counseling services, and (X) is a vector of predicted ˆ P
probabilities, while  are column vectors of estimated coefﬁcients. Different from
the previous models where monthly data are used, Z includes borrower and loan
characteristics at the time of default. Since the borrower’s selection process here
is very complicated—a delinquent borrower may be referred multiple times, and
the referrals may result in different levels of treatment—the problem is simpliﬁed
by using a cross-sectional dataset and focusing solely on the highest level of
treatment a borrower received during a delinquency spell.
Identiﬁcation of the assignment/selection model is ensured by the inclusion of
variables not in the transition model. Based on available data, the following
variables are used to predict a borrower’s assignment/selection of counseling
services: borrower gender, LTV ratio, dummies of year when a delinquency starts,
and whether the borrower received counseling previously.
 Empirical Analysis
The majority of the 60-day delinquencies were cured (65.5%), 7% were prepaid,
about 14% ended in foreclosure, and about 10% were still in delinquency at the
end of the study period (Exhibit 3). If the ﬁnal outcomes of delinquent loans are
examined without considering those temporarily cured spells, among the 1,689
60-day delinquent loans, 25% went to REO or foreclosure, 13% were prepaid
(distressed prepayment), and 39% were cured. Many delinquent borrowers were
able to pay off their mortgages through reﬁnancing or sale of the property,12
probably because of signiﬁcant appreciation in the property value during the study
period.
Exhibit 3 shows the outcomes of delinquency spells by both the timing and level
of counseling. For spells that had been counseled before the current delinquency,332  Ding, Quercia, and Ratcliffe
the curing rate is similar to that of the ‘‘contact’’ and the ‘‘none’’ groups (65%,
65%, and 66%, respectively). In contrast, delinquencies that received counseling
during the spells have a higher curing rate (72%) than those that did not (either
‘‘none’’ or ‘‘contact’’). The foreclosure rates are similar across different levels of
counseling services and are a little lower for those who received counseling.
The impact of different levels of counseling service based on when the counseling
was received (counsel spell, contact spell, counsel bef, and contact bef)a r e
considered to test whether delinquent borrowers who receive counseling are more
likely to reinstate or cure than similarly situated non-counseled borrowers. The
highest level of treatment is used for borrowers who received multiple treatments.
Delinquent borrowers who were not referred are classiﬁed as ‘‘none.’’ Counseling
received during the current delinquency spell is expected to increase the
probability of cure and reduce the risk of foreclosure, since timely delinquent
counseling should be more effective. In addition, if current delinquency is not
triggered by crisis events beyond a borrower’s control, then the borrower who
received counseling would be expected to have a higher probability of curing than
those not-counseled, since counseled borrowers should have better knowledge
and thus be better able to handle delinquencies. However since the effects of
counseling may diminish with time, it is also possible that prior counseling is less
effective.
Many factors other than counseling may inﬂuence the outcomes of delinquencies.
The following variables have been controlled in the MNL model (Exhibit 4
provides summary statistics for different samples):
 Value of the Put Option: According to the option-based theory, home
equity plays a central role in determining the probability of foreclosure.
The value of the put option of a loan for each month is calculated using
the unpaid mortgage balance, and the estimated house price is calculated
using the house price index (HPI) of the Ofﬁce of Federal Housing
Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO).13 The value of the put option indicates
the ratio of negative equity (unpaid balance minus estimated house price)
to the original house price.
 Value of the Call Option: To determine whether the call option is ‘‘in
the money,’’ the present discounted value of the current mortgage is
compared with the present discounted value of a prevailing market-rate
mortgage.14 Saving from reﬁnancing is reported as a ratio, which
indicates the fraction of saving by taking a reﬁnancing mortgage with
the prevailing market rate.
 Past Loan Performance: Past loan performance is likely to be predictive
of future loan performance. A measure is included that indicates the share
of months in which a loan is in delinquency before reaching the 60-day
delinquency.
 Loan Size: Loan size is measured by the amount of unpaid balance in
the loan.Post-purchase Counseling  333
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 Loan Age: This variable measures loan age in years when a default starts.
 Time in Delinquency: This variable indicates the number of months in
current 60-day delinquency.
 Borrower Race: As suggested in the literature (e.g., Anderson and
VanderHoff, 1999), African-American borrowers may have higher default
rates on conventional residential mortgages than other borrowers, so a
dummy variable is included to identify African-American borrowers.
 Local Economic Conditions: A borrower’s ability to cure a delinquency
or sell a property may also depend on local economic conditions. To
capture local economic impacts, monthly state unemployment rates and
MSA house price appreciation rates relative to the same quarter in the
previous year are included as indicators of general economic conditions.15
A dummy for borrowers in North Carolina is also included, because a
disproportionate number of borrowers in the sample are located there.
Exhibit 5 lists the results of ﬁve models of the transition of 60-day delinquent
loans using different study samples or different speciﬁcations. Model 1 uses a
sample of all 60-day delinquencies (January 1998 to September 2006). Model 2
focuses on 60-day delinquencies during the study period (January 2003 to
September 2006). Model 3 adds the prior counseling variables to Model 2, and
Model 4 considers counseling received during delinquency spells. Model 5 further
allows for unobserved heterogeneities among borrowers. All the continuous
variables have been standardized for estimation. A positive coefﬁcient means that
the odds of the particular outcome rather than the reference group (foreclosure)
increase as the independent variable increases; a negative coefﬁcient means the
odds decrease. The value of RRR is the relative risk ratio for a one-unit change
in the corresponding variable. It measures the risk of the category relative to the
base category, which is foreclosure here. For example, from Model 1, the odds
that an African-American borrower will remain in delinquency rather than
foreclosure are about 2.1 times the odds for non-black borrowers. In general, the
reported results of Model 1 are consistent with those of Model 2, in that estimated
coefﬁcients for the explanatory variables are of the same sign and similar size. So
the results are reliable, since the bias from focusing on a smaller sample during
a shorter observation period is not serious.
The results in Model 3 generally suggest that prior counseling has no signiﬁcant
impact on the transition of delinquent loans. The coefﬁcients for the prior
counseling variables in Model 3 are generally insigniﬁcant except contact bef,
which has a slightly signiﬁcant (at the 0.1 level) impact on the outcome of
prepayment, and the value is negative. These results have been conﬁrmed with
models using different samples and speciﬁcations that are not listed in Exhibits 5
and 6.
The results of Model 4 and Model 5 show some evidence that counseling received
during delinquency spells signiﬁcantly increases the probability of curing
(signiﬁcant at the 0.1 level in Model 4 and 0.05 level in Model 5). No signiﬁcant334  Ding, Quercia, and Ratcliffe








Risk Variable Coeff. RRR Coeff. RRR Coeff. RRR
Delinq call 0.035 1.035 0.164 1.179 0.150 1.161
put 0.222 0.801* 0.428 1.535 0.460 1.583
lupb 0.068 0.934 0.184 0.832 0.205 0.815
af american 0.775 2.170*** 1.295*** 3.651 1.301 3.671***
delinq 0.605*** 1.832*** 0.997*** 2.709 1.004 2.730***
loanage 0.176*** 0.839* 1.950*** 7.025 1.940 6.956***
dur 0.333 0.716*** 1.126 3.084*** 1.133 3.106***
unemp rate 0.098 1.103 0.006 1.006 0.004 1.004
hpi a 0.132 1.142 0.687 1.987*** 0.716 2.047***
nc 0.141 0.868 0.968 0.380*** 0.953 0.385***
counsel spell 0.167 1.182 0.065 0.937 0.624 1.867
contact spell 0.106 1.112 0.218 0.804 0.555 0.574
Cured call 0.058 0.943 0.078 0.925 0.098 0.907
put 0.257 0.773* 0.057 0.945 0.044 0.957
lupb 0.202 0.817** 0.210 0.811** 0.204 0.816**
af american 0.756 2.130*** 0.785 2.193*** 0.796 2.217***
delinq 0.712 2.039*** 0.764 2.146*** 0.759 2.136***
loanage 0.293 0.746*** 0.178 0.837 0.182 0.834
dur 1.007 0.365*** 0.950 0.387*** 0.875 0.417***
unemp rate 0.031 1.032 0.122 1.130 0.119 1.126
hpi a 0.133 1.142 0.204 1.226* 0.213 1.238*
nc 0.263 0.769 0.337 0.714* 0.314 0.731*
counsel spell 0.437 1.548* 0.810 2.249*** 1.701 5.477*
contact spell 0.339 1.404 0.455 1.576* 0.281 1.324
Prepaid  call 0.021 1.022 0.048 1.050 0.044 1.045
Modiﬁed put 0.444 0.641*** 0.373 0.688** 0.353 0.702**
lupb 0.029 0.971 0.079 1.082 0.076 1.079
af american 0.108 1.114 0.163 1.177 0.168 1.183
delinq 0.602 1.826*** 0.615 1.850*** 0.615 1.849***
loanage 0.393 0.675*** 0.300 0.741* 0.258 0.772
dur 0.540 0.583*** 0.415 0.660*** 0.416 0.660***
unemp rate 0.302 1.352** 0.252 1.287 0.229 1.257
hpi a 0.215 1.239 0.058 1.060 0.050 1.052
nc 0.143 1.153 0.240 0.787 0.245 0.783
counsel spell 0.038 0.963 0.180 1.197 0.155 1.168
contact spell 0.107 0.899 0.049 1.051 1.185 0.306
constant delinq 3.854*** 1.400*** 1.454***
cured 1.256*** 1.368*** 1.256***
PrepayModiﬁed 0.756*** 0.531** 0.395Post-purchase Counseling  335
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Exhibit 6  (continued)
MNL Estimates of the Impact of Counseling on 60-day Delinquencies (Participating Servicers)
Note: All continuous variables are standardized for estimation. Please refer to Exhibit 4 for a
detailed description of the variables. RRR is the relative risk ratio and the reference group if
foreclosure. Model 7: N  12,385 of 781 loans and log likelihood  4,762.2***; Model 8:
N  1,436 of 781 loans and 1,087.8***; Model 9: N  1,436 of 781 loans and log
likelihood  1,093.9***.
*Signiﬁcant at the 0.1 level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level.
***Signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level.
Exhibit 7  Goodness-of-Fit for Multinomial Logit Assignment/selection Estimation
Actual Participation
Mean Predicted Probabilities of Participation
None Contact Counsel N
None 78.9% 10.0% 11.1% 1,085
Contact 65.4% 20.1% 14.5% 168
Counsel 65.6% 13.7% 20.7% 183
Total 75.6% 11.7% 12.7% 1,436
Note: The predictors include borrower gender (female), original LTV ratio (97%), interest rate
spread (note rate minus the prevailing market rate at origination), dummy of the starting year of
delinquency, and dummies of whether the borrower received counseling services previously.
impact of the contact variable (contact spell) is found for all outcomes,
conﬁrming the effectiveness of counseling over a brief contact during a
delinquency spell. The odds of curing were 50% higher for borrowers who
received counseling services than for those who did not, relative to foreclosure.
As Exhibit 8 shows, this model predicts that if borrowers receive counseling
immediately after they enter a 60-day delinquency, the probability of curing in six
months will be 18% higher than for the borrowers who do not receive such
counseling. Their predicted foreclosure rates are much lower than those non-
counseled borrowers. Compared to the results from Model 3, the results suggest
that counseling services have a signiﬁcant impact on curing only if the borrower
receives counseling during the current delinquency spell.
Model 5 conﬁrms the existence of unobserved heterogeneities among borrowers.
The mass-point estimate of 1.603 undergoes a logistic transformation and336  Ding, Quercia, and Ratcliffe
indicates that approximately 83% of the delinquencies are in Group 1 and 17%
are in Group 2. As the values of the location parameters in Model 5 suggest,
Group 1 includes delinquencies with a relatively high probability of curing,
prepayment, loan modiﬁcation, or remaining in delinquency; consequently, these
delinquencies have a low probability of ending in foreclosure.16 Group 2 includes
delinquencies that have a relatively high probability of foreclosure. The signs and
magnitude of the parameters of the mass-point model are generally consistent with
the multinomial model, although a few more variables become signiﬁcant. In
particular, the magnitude of the counseling variable’s relative risk ratio on the
probability of curing is even larger and signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level.
 Assignment/Selection Model
It should be noted that there are still some sample selection and endogeneity issues
in Model 4. A series of models were tested that focus on the delinquencies that
were handled by the participating servicers and had the opportunity to receive
counseling to determine whether the results hold. The three models in Exhibit 6
focus solely on delinquencies handled by participating servicers. Like Model 4,
Model 6 uses a MNL model and a monthly dataset. Model 7 uses cross-sectional
data by focusing on loan and borrower characteristics at the beginning of default.
Model 8 is the borrower assignment/selection model. Because the sample size is
small and there are only a few loan modiﬁcations (36), the outcomes of loan
modiﬁcations and prepayments are combined into one. However, because of the
‘‘independence of irrelevant alternatives’’ assumption of the MNL model, this
method will not change the estimates for the outcomes of curing or delinquency,
the primary research interest.
Again, as Model 6 shows, the qualitative results generally do not change when
focusing on the delinquencies served by participating servicers. The only
noticeable change is that the loan size variable (lupb) becomes signiﬁcant for
curing, although the sign remains the same. Model 7 uses cross-sectional data.
Compared to the results of Model 6, there are some signiﬁcant differences for the
outcome of ‘‘delinquent,’’ including the direction of the impact of the put option
(put), loan age (loanage), and the delinquency duration variable (dur); the
signiﬁcance of house price appreciation variable (hpi a); and the dummy variable
for North Carolina residents (nc). This is primarily because Model 7 focuses on
loan and borrower characteristics at the time of default and uses the duration of
the whole delinquency spell for the duration variable. Model 7 fails to make full
use of the information during a delinquency spell (when the statuses are
delinquent), and thus the results for the outcome of delinquency change
signiﬁcantly. However, for other outcomes the results of Model 7 are generally
consistent with those of Model 6. These results conﬁrm that counseling has a
signiﬁcant and positive impact on curing and that a contact has a slightly
signiﬁcant (0.1 level) impact. The odds of curing are 2.2 times more for borrowers
who received counseling than for those who did not, relative to the odds of
foreclosure.Post-purchase Counseling  337
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3 3.3% 2.6% 59.4% 53.9% 32.7% 39.5% 4.7% 4.0%
6 5.6% 4.3% 37.9% 31.9% 49.2% 57.8% 7.3% 6.0%
9 7.3% 5.5% 25.7% 20.3% 58.1% 67.1% 8.9% 7.1%
12 8.7% 6.4% 18.2% 13.8% 63.1% 72.0% 10.0% 7.7%
Note: Projection is for a non-North Carolina non-black borrower with the mean value of all
continuous regressors except the duration variable. ‘‘Counseled’’ represents that the delinquent
borrower receives counseling immediately after entering a 60-day delinquency.
The assignment/selection model ﬁrst uses a MNL model to estimate the
probability that a delinquent borrower will receive different levels of counseling,
either ‘‘contact’’ or ‘‘counsel.’’ If the model ﬁts especially well then the mean
predicted probability of counseling should be highest for borrowers who did
receive counseling during delinquency spells. There are many unobserved factors,
however, that likely are important in explaining counseling assignment/selection
(e.g., employment status, current credit risk, household ﬁnancial situation, whether
a borrower ﬁled for bankruptcy, etc.). As a result, the MNL estimation yields an
adequate—but not particularly well-ﬁtting—model. This is illustrated in Exhibit
7, which shows the mean predicted probabilities of counseling (contact or counsel)
for each subgroup of actual level of outcomes.
In the second stage, the multinomial logit model of Equation (3) is estimated
using the estimated probability of counsel/contact instead of the observed values
(Model 8 in Exhibit 6). There is still some evidence that counseling has a
signiﬁcant impact on the probability of curing after controlling for the endogeneity
of assignment/selection: the coefﬁcient of the counseling is positive for the
outcome of curing and signiﬁcant at the 0.1 level. The magnitude of the coefﬁcient
is even greater, while the contact variable becomes insigniﬁcant. Therefore,
counseling’s estimated effectiveness is not due entirely to borrowers’ assignment/
selection to counseling.
In summary, employing models that use different samples demonstrates that the
sample selection does not cause serious bias. The assignment/selection analysis
further provides evidence in support of the overall conclusion that timely
counseling can signiﬁcantly increase the curing rate for moderately delinquent
borrowers. There are some additional explanations for the ﬁnding that prior
counseling services are not so effective in curing delinquencies. First, the
effectiveness of counseling may diminish with time. The environment and the
borrower’s situation may have changed radically to make prior counseling no338  Ding, Quercia, and Ratcliffe
longer effective. Second, if prior counseling was entirely effective, borrowers
would not have entered a new delinquency. Generally, the results support the
hypothesis that timely counseling is effective in increasing curing probability, but
the same is not necessarily true for prior counseling or multiple treatments.
 Empirical Results of Other Control Variables
Since results from the mass-point model and selection model are generally
consistent with the MNL model, the results of the other variables can be
interpreted based primarily on Model 4.
 Value of the Put Option: Delinquent borrowers with less or negative
equity in their home (larger value of put) are less likely to cure, prepay,
or stay in delinquency. Instead, they are also more likely to end in
foreclosure. They are also more likely to undergo loan modiﬁcations,
perhaps because this is the best option for a borrower with scant home
equity who demonstrates a willingness and ability to retain the home.
The results conﬁrm that delinquent loans with little or negative equity
are more likely to terminate through foreclosure or loan modiﬁcation.
When there is substantial equity in the home, delinquent borrowers are
more likely to ﬁnd solutions other than foreclosure.
 Value of the Call Option: The call option (call) does not have a
signiﬁcant effect on the outcome of delinquencies. Delinquent borrowers
are unable to reﬁnance their mortgages in the prime market because of
their high credit risk, even when the call option is signiﬁcantly ‘‘in the
money.’’ Instead, the probability of ‘‘distressed prepayment’’ is more
closely associated with equity in the home, loan age, time in delinquency,
local economic conditions, and some borrower characteristics, such as
borrower race.
 Past Loan Performance: Previous delinquency behavior is a signiﬁcant
factor in predicting foreclosure. Loans that have been delinquent over
longer periods prior to the current delinquency spell are less likely to
terminate through foreclosure. One possible explanation is the effect of
the borrower’s learning curve on the delinquency process. Borrowers
learn from prior experience and are thus more likely to survive current
delinquencies and avoid foreclosures. Considering Self-Help’s general
servicing philosophy, another explanation is servicers’ forbearance
toward habitually delinquent borrowers. Since servicers have shown
considerable forbearance in the past, it is very likely that this pattern
would continue.
 Loan Size: Delinquent loans with relatively larger balances are more
likely to be terminated through modiﬁcation and prepayment rather than
through foreclosure. Since there is usually a ﬁxed cost associated with
reﬁnance, home sale, and loan modiﬁcation, the relative cost for a loanPost-purchase Counseling  339
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with a larger unpaid balance should be lower; as a result, borrowers have
a stronger incentive to pay off or modify their loans.
 Loan Age: The results show that older loans are more likely to end in
foreclosure. However, these results need to be interpreted cautiously, as
the observation period is too short to observe the ﬁnal outcomes for some
recent originations.
 Time in Delinquency: Longer time in delinquency is found to be
negatively associated with the probability of curing, prepayment, and
remaining in delinquency. Thus a longer stay in delinquency is positively
associated with the outcome of foreclosure. This is understandable, since
the foreclosure process usually takes months or even years. The larger
expenses incurred from a longer stay in delinquency would make it
difﬁcult for the borrower to cure the delinquency.
 Borrower Race: African-Americans are signiﬁcantly more likely to stay
in delinquency and less likely to cure or prepay, relative to ending in
foreclosure. It is possible that lenders tend to give minorities more time
to work out their situations before commencing foreclosure. It is also
possible that some unobserved characteristics are not captured by the
model.
 Local Economic Conditions: The local economic condition variables are
generally insigniﬁcant in the model. There are two exceptions: area
unemployment rates are positively associated with the probability of
distressed prepayment, and higher area housing appreciation rates are
associated with a higher probability of loan modiﬁcation, relative to
foreclosure. Generally, the model predicts that in areas where property
appreciation rates are high, delinquent borrowers are more likely to ﬁnd
alternatives to foreclosure, such as sale of the home, or modiﬁcations that
allow them to keep the home. The model also predicts that in a weak
job market delinquencies are less likely to cure and borrowers are more
likely to pay off their mortgages. Finally, there is no signiﬁcant difference
between the behaviors of North Carolina delinquent borrowers and those
in other states except some variation in prepayment behavior.
 Conclusion
The proliferation of affordable mortgages with expanded eligibility criteria has
enabled more LMI families to become homeowners. At the same time, increased
lending to households with limited ﬁnancial resources raises the likelihood of
higher default rates. Efforts to promote homeownership among LMI households
will only succeed if accompanied by measures to control default rates and increase
curing rates for borrowers already reaching delinquency. In particular, post-
purchase delinquency counseling has been considered an important mechanism
to help delinquent borrowers establish a budget, set priorities, and ﬁnd the
appropriate strategies to avoid foreclosure and cure delinquency.340  Ding, Quercia, and Ratcliffe
Based on a sample of affordable loans serving LMI borrowers, there is signiﬁcant
evidence that proactive counseling services successfully increase the probability
of curing. The results demonstrate that timely delinquency counseling, even when
given over the phone, effectively increases curing probability. The analysis also
conﬁrms that counseling’s estimated effectiveness is not entirely attributable to
unobserved differences in borrower characteristics. However, the success of
counseling appears to depend on timing; that is, counseling should address an
active delinquency situation. Repeated counseling appears to have diminishing
returns. These ﬁndings suggest that well-timed, situation-appropriate counseling
is more effective and efﬁcient in increasing curing probability.
The results of this study have important implications for whether and how
mortgage counseling should be provided. In general, previous research
demonstrates that pre-purchase intensive counseling (usually classroom and
individual counseling) is effective in reducing default risk. However, as
demonstrated in this study, delinquency counseling over the phone can also
increase the curing probability for those already in delinquency. Although it might
be more costly to intervene prior to 90 days because of the high rate of borrower
self-cures, this research provides evidence that an early intervention may be
important for some delinquent borrowers, as it is sometimes impossible to
intervene successfully if a delinquency becomes very serious.
At the same time, the research leaves many questions unanswered. Speciﬁcally,
further studies would beneﬁt from a more comprehensive evaluation of the long-
term viability of those loans that received counseling and an evaluation of the
cost-beneﬁts of counseling services provided in different stages.
Further, factors were identiﬁed that inﬂuence the paths of moderately (60-day)
delinquent loans. This study conﬁrms that home equity plays an important role in
determining who is more likely to reach foreclosure or seek other solutions. Loan
payment history also affects outcomes: the longer the delinquency spell, the more
likely the loan will end in foreclosure and the less likely to cure. However, loans
that have had more prior delinquencies are actually less likely to end in
foreclosure, very probably because of lenders’forbearance and borrowers’learning
from experience. Local economic conditions and borrower characteristics also
matter in the transition of moderately delinquent loans. In sum, delinquent
affordable loans can follow a variety of courses; the ultimate fortunes of these
delinquent loans are impacted by a number of factors, including loss prevention
interventions.
 Endnotes
1 The delinquency rate for residential mortgages stood at 4.84% of all loans outstanding
in the ﬁrst quarter of 2007 [Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA), 2007]. More than
one million subprime loans were delinquent or in foreclosure in the ﬁrst quarter of 2007.
The percentage of mortgages in the foreclosure process was a record high (1.28%) in
the ﬁrst quarter of 2007 (MBA, 2007).Post-purchase Counseling  341
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2 According to Frank Nothaft (email exchange with Lei Ding on July 13, 2007), in the
Servicing Conference in February 2007, Freddie Mac changed its repayment plan
incentive to reward servicers for successful repayment plans that had been initiated at
60-day delinquencies, instead of at 90-day. Freddie Mac had seen an approximate 45%
pick up in successfully completed repayment plans when these plans were initiated
earlier in the process.
3 To qualify for the CAP program, borrowers must meet one of three criteria: (1) have an
income under 80% of the area median income (AMI) for the metropolitan area; (2) be
a minority with an income below 115% of AMI; or (3) purchase a home in a high-
minority (30%) or low-income (80% AMI) census tract and have an income below
115% AMI.
4 The 45-day delinquent loans could not be identiﬁed because the monthly records used
cannot identify the exact date of delinquency. However, the number of months the
borrower had missed making regular payments at the beginning of each month is known.
According to the records, many delinquent borrowers had already progressed to 60-day
delinquencies at the time of contact, while others were current or only 30-days
delinquent when they were reached.
5 In the early stage of the CAP program, Self-Help was not directly involved in servicing.
As a result, lenders serviced the loans according to Fannie Mae guidelines without
oversight from Self-Help. It was not until late 2002 that Self-Help developed its own
philosophy, which allowed it to become more active in the servicing arena. Since 2003,
Self-Help has established servicing guidelines and been active in the loss mitigation
process.
6 The ‘‘limited indemnity’’ rule requires lenders to retain the main recourse on loans until
12 consecutive on-time payments are made. Of the 2,835 60 day delinquencies in
Exhibit 2, 283 were returned to the original lenders. These delinquent loans were
excluded from the analysis because Self-Help could not track their performance
afterward.
7 As the payment history data suggests that a number of early-stage delinquencies (30-
day) may be driven by pending reﬁnancing plans, only those loans in moderate and
serious delinquencies (60 day) are treated as ‘‘distressed prepayments.’’
8 Most loans in this category (about 60%) became more delinquent (90 day). According
to Self-Help, many of the borrowers in this category had ﬁled for bankruptcy, which
allows them to remain in delinquency, since foreclosure proceedings may not take place
until after bankruptcies are settled. Unfortunately, a complete list of those borrowers
who ﬁled for bankruptcy was not available.
9 This term is from Danis and Pennington-Cross (2005), who ﬁnd that delinquent
borrowers are more likely to prepay than end in foreclosure. They called this type of
prepayment ‘‘distressed prepayment.’’
10 The category of foreclosure includes REO, REO sold, third-party sale, and pre-
foreclosure sale.
11 To ensure that the proportions lie within [0, 1] and sum to 1, a logistic transformation
is used on mass-point estimates:
p  exp(q )/(1  exp(q )),  mm m
where   qm and the value of pm lies within [0, 1].342  Ding, Quercia, and Ratcliffe
12 In an ongoing six-year panel survey, the authors are tracking a sample of over 3,700
CAP borrowers and whether or not they have moved is known. Among the 30 distressed
prepaid borrowers in this sample, 40% (12) have moved and it is assumed that they sold
their homes. The rest (60%) of the prepaid borrowers did not move; very likely they
reﬁnanced their mortgages using high cost subprime loans because of their higher risk.
13 Since the OFHEO house price index at the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) level
is available quarterly, each month in the same quarter is assumed to have the same
appreciation rate. If the property is located in an area outside of an MSA, state level
HPI is used. Given the MSA house price index HPIi0 at origination and HPIit in month
t, the value of the put option for house i with an original purchase price Pi0 can be
calculated for each month, t:
(upb  P (HPI /HPI )) * it i0 it i0 put  . it Pi0
14 Given the original balance (OBi), the term of the mortgage (TMi), and the interest rate
on the mortgage (Ri) for a ﬁxed rate mortgage i, the monthly payments can be calculated:
TMi (1  R) i PAY  RO B . *  ii i TMi (1  R)  1 i
The future monthly payments (PAYi) are then discounted by the interest rate (Ri)a n d
prevailing interest rate (PRi) separately. The Freddie Mac Primary Mortgage Market
Survey (PMMS) is used to proxy for prevailing interest rates on prime, conventional,
and ﬁxed-rate mortgages:
TM TM ii PAY PAY ii PDC  PDC  .  cit rit mm mtm t (1  R)( 1  PR) ii
The call option is deﬁned as the difference in the present values of the payment stream
at the mortgage note rate and the prevailing interest rate:
PDC  PDC rit cit call  . it PDCrit
15 Data on state unemployment rates are derived from the Department of Labor at: http://
www.bls.gov/lau/home.htm. MSA house price appreciation rates are derived from the
Ofﬁce of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) at: http://www.ofheo.gov/
HPI.asp.Post-purchase Counseling  343
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16 For example, as Model 5 shows, the value of the location parameter [vjm in Equation
(2)] for the outcome of curing is 13.17 and signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level, greater than the
value of the location parameter in Group 2 (0.89), and also larger than the constant of
Model 4 (3.84) when unobserved heterogeneity is not considered (treated as a group).
So, Group 1 has a larger probability of curing than Group 2.
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